

CONFIDENTIAL

17 OCT 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Security for Personnel
Security and Investigations

SUBJECT : Investigative Criteria

1. During the October Management Conference, the Director of Security discussed with the Deputy Director for Management and Services, Objective No. 12 which reads as follows: "To complete during FY 1974 a study to determine how we can streamline investigative techniques and procedures and implement during FY 1975 the approved recommendations." The first milestone covering this Objective was to "complete a review of statutory requirements for investigative coverage".

2. Mr. Brownman was advised that the purpose of the milestone was to insure that any streamlining of investigative techniques would not conflict with existing statutes and Executive Orders.

3. Mr. Brownman requested that the Office expand the milestone and look into our current investigative requirements, particularly the 15 year background check. He stated that the key issue involved in streamlining investigative techniques is revalidating the requirements of an investigation. With the changes in our culture, morals and technology, can the old investigative requirements withstand scrutiny today? This not only applies to the 15 year background check but also those items which are involved in the check - neighborhoods, informants, education, employment, etc. The necessity for National Agency Checks should also be revalidated. What is wanted is a total review of all requirements with recommended changes which would result in a lesser expenditure of resources provided the risk to the national security would not be increased above today's risk. It was agreed that, as a first

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step, research would be conducted into E.O. 9835, E.O. 10450 and any appropriate congressional hearings and statutes to determine the reason behind the 15 year period. Why 15 years vs. 10 years or why 15 continuous years vs. 3 consecutive years in each of 3 five-year periods? It was also agreed that the Office would conduct a random sample of investigative cases, both staff and contractor employee, to determine what information would have been missed by going back only 10 years versus 15 years.

STATSPE 4. Another issue raised by Mr. Brownman was the necessity of clearing practically all employees through Top Secret; U.S. citizen [redacted] employees for example. Could not some classes of employees be cleared through the Secret level thus reducing investigative coverage, resulting in increased savings?

25X1A 5. Mr. Brownman also asked that we look into the reason [redacted] requested that we look into the feasibility of conducting a company by company study covering a 2-4 year period of the rejection rate. He feels that the companies are not doing sufficient prescreening to reduce the number of "bad apples" they are submitting for clearance.

25X1A 6. Based upon the above, you are requested to initiate studies which would satisfy the DD/M&S requirements. Any questions covering such requirements can be related to Mr. [redacted] x5311, R.L. 1141.

[redacted]

25X1A

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Investigative Criteria

FROM: 25X1A

[Redacted]
 Acting Chief
 Plans, Programs Branch

EXTENSION

5311

NO.

DATE

15 October 1973

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

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OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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25X1A
 [Redacted] also was
 doing some research
 on this general topic.